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Introduction
Bribery' and corruption 2 are age-old problems 3 that are receiving more
attention today than ever before. 4 During the past few years, international
scandals have reduced tolerance for corruption5 and increased receptive-
ness to legal solutions that, until recently, commentators viewed suspi-
ciously.6 This trend extends around the world, even reaching nations
presumably resistant to Western capitalist initiatives-developing commu-
nist or formerly-communist countries, 7 such as China8 and Russia. 9 The
1. Michael Philips formulated a good working definition of bribery as "payment (or
promise of payment) for a service." Michael Philips, Bribery, 94 ETHICS 621, 622 (1984).
John Macrae provides a consistent but more detailed definition of bribery in the form of
what he calls an "arrangement": "An arrangement is a private exchange between two
parties... which: (1) has an influence on the allocation of resources either immediately
or in the future, and (2) involves the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for
private ends." John Macrae, Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game
Theory Approach, 10 WORLD DEV. 677, 678 (1982) (suggesting arrangement as a substi-
tute for corruption).
2. Corruption can be a broader category than bribery, potentially including
"[plolitical pressures ... social influences, physical force or blackmail or other extor-
tion." Lawrence W. Newman, The New OECD Convention and Bribery, N.Y. .J., Mar. 29,
1999, at 3. This article will use the term "corruption" in its narrower sense, as mani-
fested in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, to focus on bribery-related aspects.
3. Not surprisingly, condemnation is virtually universal. See THOMAS DONALDSON
& THOMAS W. DuNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BuSINESs ETH.
ics 222-33 (1999) (describing bribery as a practice that violates hypernorms, which are
values held across cultures). While exceptions are rare, some commentators present
contrary arguments. See, e.g., Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., The Right to Pay Bribes, J. COM.,
May 23, 1997, at 6A (contending, inter alia, that bribery can be "an institutional bulwark
of prosperity ... a beneficial practice for everyone involved" and morally defensible).
4. Recent heightened attention in the United States has been precipitated by the
Salt Lake City Olympics 2002 scandal, as well as concern that U.S. companies suffer a
strategic disadvantage due to the nation's historic hard line against bribery. For discus-
sion of the Salt Lake City scandal, see Jim Byers, A Year Later, IOC Struggles to Find
Balance, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
For discussion of concerns regarding U.S. competitiveness, see Kari Lynn Diersen, For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 36 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 753, 764-65 (1999).
5. See John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption: No
Longer Taboo, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 17, 18 (discussing recent bribery
scandals that have shaken or toppled governments, including those in Indonesia, Paki-
stan, South Korea, Japan, Spain, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, Columbia, Italy,
Zaire, and China).
6. Suspicion has only been reduced, not eliminated. See Gary M. Wederspahn,
Exporting Corporate Ethics, GLOBAL WORKFORCE SUPPLEMENT TO WORKFORCE, Jan. 1997,
available in Westlaw, BAMP Database (observing resistance to the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act because "ethical rules governing business practices are subject to cultural prac-
tices and beliefs").
7. For discussion of corruption in transitional economies, see generally Agnieszka
Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32
STAN. J. INT'L L. 121 (1996).
8. See James Harding & James Kynge, Tentacles of Corruption May Threaten the
State, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1999, at 4 (discussing the "Ningbo scam" and the pervasive
corruption that arguably is weakening Chinese rule).
9. See Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir L. Lechtman, In Russia, Bribe Ban is Caus-
ing Difficulties: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act May Be Difficult to Interpret Now that
Firms are Privatized, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 7, 1996, at Cl (noting the proliferation of new anti-
bribery laws in Russia).
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Chinese government, for example, sees recent bribery and financial fraud
scandals as a threat to its authority.10 As a result, corruption took a promi-
nent position in the National People's Congress's' discussions during the
1999 sessions.12 Through growing international openness,' 3 pressures to
cooperate with global anti-bribery initiatives are escalating.
14
The battle against corruption can be mounted in two different ways:
legislation and institutional change. Legislative solutions, such as domes-
tic anti-bribery laws, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),' 5 and the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Convention
(OECD Convention),1 6 attempt to modify undesirable behavior, primarily
by imposing criminal fines, incarceration, or other penalties. Yet bribery
that is caused or exacerbated by socio-structural problems may be
addressed best by extra-legal solutions.
The order imposed by legal mandate may be ineffectual if the prohib-
ited behaviors are firmly grounded in pernicious political, social, or eco-
nomic institutions such as patronage, nepotism, unaccountability, low
government wages, poverty, and generally weak economic conditions.' 7 To
the extent that these causes of corruption are compelling, legislative efforts
to eliminate bribes may be futile, akin to pulling a weed without removing
its roots.' 8 Statutes like the FCPA may be doomed to failure because they
order behavior rather than trying to fix the systematic problems that insti-
gate the behavior. This reasoning could explain why corruption remains a
serious problem despite ubiquitous domestic laws that prohibit bribery.
10. See Harding & Kynge, supra note 8, at 4.
11. The National People's Congress is China's parliament.
12. SeeJames Harding, Officials Arrested over Chinese Fraud Scandal, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1999, at 4.
13. While this article focuses on openness as transparency of business activities and
transactions, openness fits more broadly into a global social movement toward increas-
ing corporate accountability. For discussion of this trend, see generally Robin Broad &
John Cavanagh, The Corporate Accountability Movement: Lessons & Opportunities, 23
FLETCHER F. WoRLD An. 151 (1999).
14. For example, Leslie Holmes suggests that glasnost has allowed Russians to
become informed about failings in their system and living standards in other countries,
perhaps leading to "regime delegitimation" and increased corruption. LESLIE HOLMES,
THE END oF COMMUNIST PowER: ANn-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS AND LEGITIMATION CRISIS
217-18 (1993). Increased corruption and public awareness of the problem are likely to
place pressure for reform on the governing regime.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (Supp. 1999).
16. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
17. See Rowan Bosworth-Davies, Corruption: The Prisoner's Dilemma, FIN. TIMES BUS.
REP.: FRAUD REP., Nov. 1, 1997, at 6.
18. See John D. Sullivan, Statement on Bribery and Corruption in the OSCE Region
(July 21, 1999) <http://www.cipe.org/efn/bribery.htn-l> ("You cannot get at the root
causes of corruption by merely weeding out corrupt individuals .... Corruption thrives
in markets where... the rule of law is not embedded within cultural norms .... "); Brian
C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New
Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 159, 182-84 (2000)
(discussing an attack on corruption's roots as a "foundational principle" in the battle
against transnational bribery).
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Institutional reform 19 may be more effective. 20 Such reform seeks to
reduce or eliminate corrupt behavior by understanding the underlying
causes and altering social realities to attack those causes.2 1 For example, if
poverty exacerbates corruption,2 2 then the war against poverty, intention-
ally or inadvertently, provides an institutional outlet to combat corruption.
While institutional changes may have greater potential than legislative
mechanisms in the battle against bribery, they can be difficult to achieve.
A particular source of trouble lies in the cyclical nature of some structural
causes of corruption, where the causes of bribery are also its effects. In
those cases, corruption is self-perpetuating.
Poverty, for example, is both a structural cause of bribery and a struc-
tural effect.2 3 Corruption diverts a nation's resources away from the citi-
zenry and into the pockets of the corrupt elite, contributing to poverty.
2 4
In developing nations, corruption also diverts scarce government resources
to sub-optimal projects. 25 These phenomena deplete public treasuries,
2 6
making it harder to pay civil servants subsistence wages. 2 7 Poor civil ser-
vants are more tempted to seek bribes and to view the practice as morally
justifiable. 28 The process reinforces itself-poverty causes bribery, which
19. "Structural change" and "institutional reform" are used interchangeably in this
article.
20. Even proponents of serious legal reform recognize both (a) perceptions that laws
have been ineffectual to date and (b) the need for what the Managing Director of Trans-
parency International, USA calls "complementary reforms" in areas such as civil service
and the media. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, The Law, Expectation, and Reality in the Mar-
ketplace: The Problems of and Responses to Corruption, 30 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 139,
139 (Supp. 1999) (acknowledging "widely-held public belief that, despite a plethora of
anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws already on the books, little has changed to date"
and recommending complementary institutional reforms).
21. Institutional reform can be achieved in a variety of ways. David Hess and
Thomas Dunfee put forth one intriguing example-reform via internalization of univer-
salized principles. For elaboration of this model, see David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee,
Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J 593 (2000).
22. For a good exposition of the cyclical relationship between economic
underdevelopment and corruption, see Robin Theobald, Lancing the Swollen African
State: Will it Alleviate the Problem of Corruption?, 32 J. MoD. A'. STUD. 701, 701-03
(1994).
23. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 Sw.
J. L. & TRADE Am. 179, 180 (1996) (observing that bribery causes a variety of political,
social, and economic problems, including protracted poverty and the undermining of
democracy).
24. See Frank Vogl, ... And New Corruption, WASH. PosT, May 25, 1997, at C7
(describing corruption in Zaire, where Mobutu Sese Seko allegedly received billions of
dollars in bribes while much of the population "languished in absolute poverty").
25. See Michael Hershman, A Blow Against Bribery, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at 14.
26. See Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and the Col-
lective, a Comparison, 12 EMORY Irr'L L. Rev. 739, 755 (1998) (referring to this process
as "'plunder' of the country").
27. See Hershman, supra note 25, at 14.
28. See On the Take, EcONOMIsT, Nov. 19, 1988, at 21, 22 (arguing that weak states
and associated poverty breed disrespect and disloyalty, so that "corruption seems emi-
nently sensible, since it involves robbing from the state in order to give to relatives and
friends who provide the security that the state is too feeble to deliver").
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exacerbates existing structural problems, including increased poverty, that
lead to more bribery.29 Like any vicious circle, poverty-aggravated corrup-
don tenaciously resists reform.
Of course, legislative mechanisms and structural change need not be
discrete categories. 30 Laws can modify institutions and social structures
that support or encourage bribery. While some legislative approaches have
sought to effectuate at least a partial structural change,31 others have been
purely legal edict aimed at criminalizing offending activities.
32
Commentators have criticized extraterritorial legal edicts of the latter
variety as heavy-handed, given their dubious efficacy to date33 and their
potential for legal34 and cultural3 5 invasiveness. On the other hand, these
concerns are countered by an increasingly recognized need to campaign
29. This problem is a specific example of the general inefficiency of departing from
open, free markets characterized by high levels of honest dealings. See Scott D. Syfert,
Capitalism or Corruption? Corporate Structure, Western Investment and Commercial Crime
in the Russian Federation, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 357, 385 (1999) ("Gener-
ally, corruption misallocates resources, drains national treasuries of tax revenue, and
allows incompetent and inefficient industries to escape the chastening rigors of the free
market.")
30. For example, extraterritorial legislation prohibiting bribery could be viewed as
structural. Laws establish constraints for the environment within which actors operate.
Thus, laws combine with social and economic factors to influence actor behavior. For
present purposes, legislation will be differentiated because it does not address the
"underlying" structural problems that permit or encourage bribery. These problems,
such as poverty and low public-sector salaries, are extra-legal in nature. Structural solu-
tions erode these foundations of bribery, instead of simply prohibiting bribery itself.
At least two dynamics justify this distinction. First, eliminating the causes of a behav-
ior may be a more potent solution than criminalizing the behavior. Second, since extra-
territorial legislation bears significant costs in terms of respect for international issues
and cultural heterogeneity, alternatives to extraterritorial statutes should be considered
ia separate and distinct option.
31. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1999) (setting record-keeping standards).
32. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (Supp. 1999) (prohibiting bribery of foreign
officials).
33. Despite over two decades of extraterritorial legislation in the United States under
the FCPA, bribery by U.S. companies remains a major problem. A recent Department of
Commerce report noted allegations of bribes associated with $37 billion in contracts for
the first four months of 1999, reflecting 55 separate incidents. See Stephen Fidiler,
Defence Contracts 'Pervaded by Graft,' FIN. TiMEs, July 7, 1999, at 4. Moreover, in 1999,
Transparency International rated countries on reputations for paying bribes. Despite
the world's toughest laws, the United States rated "in the middle of the pack." Skip
Kaltenheuser, Practicing What U.S. Preaches?, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 31, 1999, at Money &
Business 4.
34. Like any extraterritorial statute, the FCPA cannot avoid some degree of legal
reaching. Lucinda Low and Timothy Trenkle note, however, that the FCPA has been less
aggressive in this regard than other extraterritorial U.S. statutes. See Lucinda A. Low &
Timothy P. Trenkle, U.S. Antibribery Law Goes Global, Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1999, at
14, 17 ("Although enacted in an era of aggressive U.S. extraterritoriality, the FCPA was
less aggressive than some of its contemporary statutes.").
35. See generally Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature
Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 223 (1999) (discussing the
dangers when one state imposes value-laden standards on other states). For further
discussion of the delicate problem of ethics in transnational contexts, see Sam Garkawe,
The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, E-LAw
(Mar. 1995) <www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2nl/garkawe.txt>.
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aggressively against the serious problem of bribery.36 The tension between
these two concerns leaves a tough challenge: to determine how easy, sub-
optimal legislative solutions37 and difficult, potentially effective structural
solutions38 should be balanced to reduce corruption, while giving due con-
sideration to comity39 and appropriate respect 4° to sovereignty, autonomy,
and culture. 41 This article, examining ways that structural solutions can
complement or supplant 42 extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation, is part
of that enterprise.
To propose sensible structural changes to fight corruption, it helps to
understand corruption's causes and characteristics. Accordingly, Section I
explores how bribery and corruption are affected by transaction variables,
such as payment size and the motivation for payment. Section II discusses
and examines the supply and demand sides of bribe transactions. Evaluat-
ing potential solutions, Section III examines the limitations of legislation in
fighting bribery and corruption. Section IV makes policy recommenda-
tions, in particular noting the ways in which extraterritorial legal edict can
be supplanted or reinforced by institutional change.
36. See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable
and Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth
Century? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MIcH.J. Irr'L
L. 451, 454 (1999) ("The idea that transnational bribery must be controlled, and the
legislation that could implement the idea, are in fact desirable policy choices. Transna-
tional bribery constitutes a significant threat to global security. As such, its control is
the right and the obligation of every polity that is able to do so.").
37. Legislative solutions are relatively easy to implement because an official legisla-
tive body exists especially for the purpose of enacting solutions. Legislative solutions
are sub-optimal because they fail to address the causes of corruption and have yet to.
extirpate bribery around the world.
38. Structural solutions are difficult to implement because they require sustained
efforts to effect social change, a process that can consume massive resources, including
but not limited to time, effort, and money. Structural solutions are potentially effective
because they attempt to address the causes of corruption. In this sense, they provide the
potential for more sweeping and sustainable reform.
39. See H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government's Cam-
paign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 407, 418 (1999)
(observing that, despite its impressive legislative power, Congress traditionally exercises
extraterritorial authority "sparingly").
40. This respect is largely a function of the degree to which extraterritorially applied
laws are considered legitimate. For discussion of the importance of legitimacy in con-
temporary conceptions of international law, see generally Paul B. Stephan, The New
International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global
Order, 70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1555 (1999).
41. But see A.W. Cragg, Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corrup-
tion, 53 ITrr'L J. 643, 655 (1998) (noting that justification of bribery as adaptation to
local custom fuels corruption and reinforces the local custom, a self-fulfilling situation).
42. The discussion herein will refer to both options for two reasons. First, objec-
tions to extraterritorial legislation are declining and will continue to decline in the
future. See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 LAw &
POi'Y Irr'L Bus. 47, 75 (1999). Second, even if extraterritorial legislation may not yet be
appropriate and advisable, it appears to be a reality in the new millennium.
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I. Transaction Variables that Affect the Nature of Bribery and
Corruption
Structural solutions are predicated on the following axiom: to expunge cor-
ruption, institutions must understand its causes.43 A critical role for schol-
arship in this area is to describe, explicate, and analyze the structures that
support bribery. This Section examines two critical transaction-specific
factors, or micro-level variables, that determine when and why bribes are
paid: the size of a bribe and the motives for a bribe.44
A. Size
The following discussion suggests that the causes and effects of grand and
petty bribery are not identical.45 While the structural foundations that
support grand and petty bribery sometimes overlap, they differ in impor-
tant ways. In Section IV, the differences between grand and petty bribery
will be used to support an argument for limiting extraterritorial prohibi-
tions of bribery, if adopted, to instances of grand bribery.46
1. How Do Grand and Petty Bribery Differ in Cause and Effect?
The most obvious difference between grand and petty bribery is defini-
tional-the dimension of size. While any line drawn will be arbitrary, there
is a buffer zone around which grand and petty bribery diverge. A bribe
valued above $1000 is relatively large; a bribe valued below $100 is rela-
tively small. A demarcation point in the buffer zone is rationally impossi-
ble to choose, but pragmatically necessary for the purposes of this
discussion. Accordingly, grand bribery will be defined as bribes valued in
excess of $1000, and petty bribery will be defined as bribes valued up to
and through $1000. Although imprecise, these categories parallel the
prosecutorial discretion exercised to date.4 7
Size indicates why a bribe may be sought, as well as the bribe's social
effects. Bribe scale directly influences bribe impact; the greater any bribe's
magnitude, the greater its potential negative effect. A bribe of thousands or
millions of dollars is likely to entail greater economic, political, and social
43. See Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption
in the Judiciary, 30 LA-W & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 95, 96 (Supp. 1999) ("[lit is important to
identify the causes of corruption in order to design measures ... to prevent and control
corrupt behavior.").
44. "Micro-level variables" refer to aspects of bribery peculiar to any given transac-
tion or category of transactions. Size falls in this category because any single transaction
can be classified by size; moreover, transactions can be grouped by size. Motive also
satisfies this definition. "Macro-level variables" refer to aspects of the government, econ-
omy, or society-at-large that affect all transactions. Globalization of free trade falls in
this category because it influences all transactions.
45. Even if there are categories of bribery that can be differentiated on the basis of
size or degree, the classifications must be crude, and the lines between them imprecise.
This limitation exists throughout the law and must be viewed as a constraint on, not a
bar to, the development of a taxonomy based on magnitude and severity.
46. See infra Part lV.A.
47. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
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costs than a bribe of a few dollars or hundreds of dollars.48
The distinction, however, is not only quantitative; it is also qualitative.
It is likely that there are fewer large-scale bribes paid in the world than
small-scale bribes.49 If this assertation is true, it is possible that cumula-
tive small-scale bribery-the total amount of small-scale bribes paid over a
given period-could comprise a larger total payment amount than cumula-
tive large-scale bribery.
Assume for the moment that small-scale bribery occurs more fre-
quently than large-scale bribery and the cumulative amount of small-scale
bribes equals or exceeds that of large-scale bribes. Observers still perceive
large-scale bribery as more harmful than small-scale bribery,50 perhaps
because of the specific nature of the transactions associated with large-
scale bribery. Why does a corporate agent pay millions of dollars to a
government official? Case studies consistently provide the answer: to gain
a competitive advantage in contract bidding or exert some form of
improper competitive influence. 51 Why does a corporate agent pay a few
dollars to a government official? While the motives for petty bribery are
less consistent than the motives for grand bribery, it is unlikely that a
motive for petty bribery is to seek illicit advantage in contract procurement.
Insignificant amounts are unlikely to sway decision-makers in the granting
of government contracts. The motives for petty bribery often will be as
insignificant as the payments.
There are exceptions to the general rule that grand bribery has a grand
impact and petty bribery has a petty impact. For example, small bribes
paid to building inspectors may have significant impact. If an inspector
receives a petty bribe and, as a result, approves a building despite code
violations, the occupants' safety may be compromised. Yet while grand
48. A large-scale bribe exacts greater social costs for a variety of reasons. If one
considers bribery a waste of corporate resources, then a large bribe wastes more
resources than a small bribe. If one views bribery as an enticement toward sub-optimal
decision-making, then a large bribe provides greater enticement and is more likely to
have a subversive effect. The largest, most enticing bribes encourage the most
deplorable abdications of responsible decision-making.
Since a bribe, like any transaction, is subject to some level of negotiation, a larger
bribe is likely to buy a larger concession. A public official probably will not divert a
contract from bidder A to bidder B, potentially sacrificing the safety and quality of an
important public works project, for a nominal bribe. A sizeable concession and the con-
comitant risk demand sizeable compensation. Therefore, the concessions granted for
small bribes are more likely to be relatively unimportant, while the concessions granted
for large bribes are more likely to be relatively serious.
49. See Robert W. Armstrong, An Empirical Investigation of International Marketing
Ethics: Problems Encountered by Australian Firms, 11 J. Bus. ETmics 161, 166, 169 (1992)
(finding in survey of Australian international marketing managers that small-scale brib-
ery occurs more frequently than large-scale bribery).
50. See id. at 167 (finding in a survey of Australian international marketing manag-
ers that large-scale bribery is considered a more important problem than small-scale
bribery).
51. Such bribes contribute to the amount of business lost by U.S. firms to interna-
tional competitors. See Clara Van Haste, Corruption, Bribery, and US Law: A Deck
Stacked Against US Developers, ELEcRICAL WoRLD, May 1996, at 37, 38 (citing CIA study
attributing U.S. loss of $45 billion of business to bribes in over 100 cases).
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bribes are consistently associated with major motives and consequences,
petty bribes are distinct because they lack any consistently significant
motive or impact.
5 2
Cumulatively, petty bribes have a relatively insignificant impact.
Because the stakes of petty bribery tend to be small, the social ramifica-
tions also tend to be small. Compare this impact to the consequences of a
large-scale bribe. When a government awards a contract to build a bridge
based on the biggest bribe rather than the soundest engineering plans, it is
more likely the bridge will collapse and injure or kill people. 53 Further-
more, when governments consistently award industry contracts to bribe-
paying firms at the expense of bribe-eschewing firms, the latter are more
likely to be driven from the market, despite their superior ethical stance
and any other superior business attributes.54 From this perspective, grand
bribery may have an undesirable "business selection" impact, where the
quality of surviving firms decreases because of unbridled predation and
avarice. 5
5
The amalgamation of thousands of petty bribes is unlikely to bear
such onerous consequences. Lives are less likely to be lost and superior
businesses are less likely to fail as a result of petty bribery. These conclu-
sions do not suggest support for petty bribery, establish that petty bribery
is ethical, or deny that petty bribery may have serious ramifications. On
the other hand, the cumulative impact of petty bribery probably does not
compare to the cumulative impact of grand bribery, and given this and
52. Given these distinctions, it should be noted that "grand" and "petty" are not
respectively synonymous with payments prohibited by the FCPA and payments permit-
ted by the FCPA because tendered for "routine governmental action." See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (Supp. 1999). Although there may be a correlation between
small payment size and a motivation to receive routine government action, the two cate-
gories sometimes diverge. Small payments can be made for non-routine dispensations.
For example, a bidder could tender a payment of one hundred dollars, a petty amount,
for tax concessions that are not "routine governmental actions," but nonetheless may be
morally difficult to classify across cultures. See, e.g., Arthur L. Kelly, Italian Tax Mores,
in CASE STUaIs IN BUSINESS, SociEry, AND ETHics 272 (Tom L Beauchamp ed., 4th ed.
1998).
53. See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw.J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 269, 280 (1998).
What society would want to construct a major bridge, tunnel or public building
where the best company for the job was excluded because it would not bribe a
government official to procure the contract? When that bridge collapses
because of faulty work, who is going to answer that a bribe paying shoddy con-
tractor was hired because he gave Schmiergeld?
Id.
54. See Inghie Kwik, Poential Exportiers Ripped Off, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 26, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, JKPOST File (observing that in a corrupt system, "[ilt
is simply not possible to prosper in business without compromising ... ethics and
business integrity").
55. Philip Nichols observed that in corrupt systems, suppliers get contracts because
of the bribes paid, rather than product quality or reasonable costs. See Philip M. Nich-
ols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28 LAw &
POL'Y Ir''L Bus. 305, 338 (1997). From this observation, it is plausible that bribe-
eschewing firms will tend to be selected out, as the loss of contracts reduces their profit-
ability and increases the risk of an operating loss and eventual dissolution.
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other dynamics discussed herein, a legitimate basis exists for treating the
two classes differently. Section IV explores how this classification might
affect the policies adopted to fight global corruption.
5 6
2. Differentiated Enforcement Rigor, Based on Bribe Magnitude
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or the Commission) enforce the FCPA.57 Historically,
agency enforcement activity has been very limited;58 more recently, it has
been expanding.59 The DOJ and SEC seem to exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion based on magnitudes of bribery. Although nothing in the statute's lan-
guage limits the FCPA to large-scale corruption, enforcement over the life of
the statute has been selective,60 focusing on substantial bribes tendered by
high-ranking officers of the paying organization.61 This prosecutorial dis-
cretion suggests that law enforcement officials recognize qualitative dis-
tinctions between grand and petty bribery.
Consider a sampling of cases pursued in the 1990s. The history of
implementation 62 reveals that the agencies have applied the FCPA sporadi-
cally,63 with a moderate recent upsurge in investigations.64 As of 1995,
U.S. agencies had prosecuted only monetary bribes, covering a wide
range-from $22,000 to $9.9 million.65 Despite this broad variation, the
lowest amounts still qualify as grand bribery. Prosecutorial discretion may
have already established a de facto prohibition limited to instances of
56. See infra Part IV.A.
57. See Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001, 59,003
(1980).
58. See Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include
a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 192 (1994) (describing enforcement of the
FCPA's anti-bribery provisions as "extremely limited").
59. See Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC Authority
into Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 120 (1998)
(referring to a "current increase in the SEC's prosecution of antibribery violations").
60. See Steven Barth, An Ounce of Prevention, WORLD TRADE, Sept. 1998, at 40, 43
(observing only 16 FCPA prosecutions for bribery through 1995 and approximately 75
DOJ cases open in 1998).
61. See Marianne Lavelle, Nations Try to Match U.S. on Biz Bribe Law, NAT'L Lj.,Jan.
20, 1997, at B1, B2 ("The law does not say, but, as a practical matter, attorneys agree
that big payoffs raise red flags.").
62. For discussion of the FCPA's implementation in a variety of specific cases, see
Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Brib-
ery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 207, 211-20 (1996).
63. See Dominic Bencivenga, Anti-Bribery Campaign: SEC Cracks Down on Illegal Pay-
ments Abroad, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 10, 1997, at 5 (noting increased SEC enforcement of the
FCPA after a ten-year hiatus).
64. See James K. Lehman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 S.C. LAw., Mar.-Apr. 1996,
at 38, 38 (noting recent increased prominence of the FCPA due in part to "increased
emphasis on white collar corporate investigations" by the DOJ and the SEC).
65. See A. Timothy Martin, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends and
Applicable Laws, 36 ALBERTA L. REv. 416, 425 (1998).
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grand bribery.6 6
Most cases involved hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in
illicit payments. In 1994, the U.S. government charged Lockheed Corpora-
tion with FCPA violations. 6 7 In 1995, Lockheed admitted paying an Egyp-
tian official $1 million to facilitate the sale of aircraft. 68 A 1996 SEC civil
action against Montedison under the FCPA's accounting provisions alleged
illegal payments of approximately $400 million to Italian officials.69 In
SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., the Commission charged Triton with making
hundreds of thousands of dollars of illegal payments to improperly influ-
ence Indonesian auditors and tax officials.
70
Recall that the FCPA prohibits any corrupt "offer, payment, promise to
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise
to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value" to foreign offi-
cials by designated parties.7 1 Despite this broad language, selective
enforcement to date suggests that the U.S. government focuses exclusively
on infractions involving at least tens of thousands of dollars. This U.S.
emphasis raises important policy questions.
First, do enforcement agencies make a principled distinction between
large-scale and small-scale corruption in their exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, or do they simply lack the resources to identify and pursue all
violations, choosing to maximize impact by focusing on the most egregious
and newsworthy cases? Second, if there is a de facto, enforcement-based
limitation of the FCPA to large-scale bribery, will the enforcement agencies
continue to operate under this limitation? Third, if the FCPA continues to
be exclusively applied to large-scale bribes, does media coverage reflect this
trend, or do the media also highlight smaller-scale bribery, providing the
public with the potentially mistaken impression that small bribes are a sig-
nificant statutory target?
7 2
These issues explore one overarching question: is there any principled
and widely understood policy under which the FCPA is applied exclusively
to large-scale bribes? If so, concern regarding the moral imperialism of
66. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. v. Lockheed Corp. et al., Cr. No. 1:94-CR-226 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
68. See Andy Pasztor, Lockheed Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Violate Anti-Bribery Reg-
ulations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at B6.
69. See Michael F. Zeldin & Carlo di Florio, Global Risk Management Under Interna-
tional Anticorruption Conventions, A. CoR'. CotNs. Ass'N DocK-r, Jan. 2000, at 18, 22,
available in Westlaw, 18 No. 1 ACCA Docket 18.
70. For detailed discussion of this case, see Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and
DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The
Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 303,
357-72 (1998).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. 1999).
72. These questions are important because the potential for moral imperialism
increases in cases of petty bribery. See generally Salbu, supra note 35 (discussing moral
imperialism). The dangers of moral imperialism are most compelling when situations
involve cultural differences-for example, the propriety of varying degrees of elaborate-
ness of entertainment. Salient cultural differences vanish when a multi-million dollar
bribe is paid to achieve a concession in the grant of a government contract.
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extraterritorial legislation 73 may be exaggerated, given the relatively unam-
biguous moral position of grand bribery.74 If there is no principled, publi-
cized, and widely understood basis for excluding petty bribery from
prosecution, then international businesspersons lack assurance that their
petty transactions will be exempt from extraterritorial legislation.
This ambiguity is troublesome for international businesspersons
because petty bribery is difficult to classify as corrupt or non-corrupt
across cultures, compared to most large-scale bribes. First, it is not as easy
to identify or ascribe a motive for many small-scale bribes.7 5 Second, petty
bribes often take the form of gifts, hospitality, and entertainment, the
appropriateness of which frequently is contingent on culture. 76 Enforce-
ment agencies are far more likely to err in ascribing motives to small for-
eign tributes and gratuities, which may serve legitimate local social
functions not contemplated by law enforcement.
7 7
The risk of moral imperialism arises if businesspersons are in legal
jeopardy or believe they are in legal jeopardy when they comply with rela-
tively innocuous or socially beneficial local customs regarding petty pay-
ments or gifts. 7 8 If a natural and rational risk-aversion causes
businesspersons to reject such customs, they may offend local officials and
lose valuable business 7 9 due to an overreaching, rigid law.8 0 If business-
persons proceed and are prosecuted or worried about prosecution, they are
penalized for exercising reasonable judgment under conditions where their
behavior would be harmless under any analysis, or even acceptable or
desirable in a given locale.8 1 Section IV explores this problem in greater
73. See supra note 72.
74. See Armstrong, supra note 49, at 167 (finding, in a survey of Australian interna-
tional marketing managers, that large-scale bribery, while relatively infrequent, was con-
sidered more important than small-scale bribery and conferral of gifts, entertainment,
and favors).
75. See infra Part I.B.
76. See Salbu, supra note 35, at 232-40.
77. See id. at 243-51.
78. See Alan Gersten, Ignorance is Not Excused, GLOBAL COM., Jan 15, 1997, at 1C
("For U.S. Companies-particularly smaller and new-to-market firms just venturing
abroad-navigating between local customs and U.S. anti-corruption laws can be
troublesome.").
79. See JAMFs R. BASCHE, JR., UNusuAL FOREIGN PAYMENTs: A SURVEY OF THE POLIcIEs
AND PRACTCES OF U.S. COMPANmEs 2 (1976) (noting competitive necessity as a reason
repeatedly posited by U.S. executives for tendering payments).
80. This hypothesis grounds claims that the once-unilateral FCPA reduced the inter-
national competitiveness of U.S. companies. See Lisa Harriman Randall, Note, Multi-
lateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657, 674-75
(1997) (observing, but also noting challenges to, the idea that the FCPA hurt U.S. firms
due to the loss of business to foreign competitors).
81. One categorization of bribes reflects the variety of complex, ambiguous motives
behind bribes generally and small bribes especially. Classifications include security
payments, expediting payments, unsupported non-government payments, lawful foreign
political contributions, and the catch-all category of "questionable payments." Mark
Bader and Bill Shaw discuss these categories, derived from a 1970s report to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 640-41 (1983).
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detail and proposes a legislative policy solution.82
B. Motive (Greed vs. Need)
Public officials' motivation for taking or soliciting bribes is a complex
issue.83 Like other forms of human behavior, bribery can be actuated by
mixed motives. 84 Notwithstanding this complexity, the motivation for
bribery must be explored to understand corruption and forge promising
solutions. 85 By identifying the functions that bribes serve, governments
can structure better laws and policies to curb corruption. 86
This Section will not examine all possible dimensions of bribe-taking
motivation. Instead, it illustrates a single, important motivational dichot-
omy: greed vs. need. Although the generalization is imperfect, greed ordi-
narily motivates large-scale bribe-seeking, while need frequently motivates
small-scale bribe-seeking.87
The first part of this proposition is more robust than the second. A
public official who seeks a bribe of millions of dollars is not motivated by
the need to feed, clothe, and house a family.8 8 In contrast, low-ranking
public officials may be so poorly paid in some countries 89 that bribes are
not only tempting inducements, 90 but also necessary for survival. 91 This
fact does not eliminate the likelihood that other public officials may be
82. See infra Part IV.A.
83. This Section focuses on bribe-taking rather than bribe-giving because the
demand side of bribery has been largely ignored by transnational policy. See infra Part
I. Since the FCPA and the OECD Convention are supply-side solutions, the interesting
issues and untapped enforcement potential involve the demand side.
84. See Salbu, supra note 35, at 248-51.
85. See Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 43, at 96.
86. Bribe-taking motivation may be more complicated than bribe-giving motivation.
When a payment or gratuity is corrupt, rather than a form of etiquette or protocol, the
motive is usually simple; the recipient demanded the bribe, or the giver believes it will
yield some advantage. As explained in this Section, motivations for bribe-taking often
are more complex.
87. See Ernest Harsch, Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in
Africa, 31 J. MOD. Ar STUD. 31, 36 (1993) (noting that petty corruption-corruption at
lower bureaucratic levels-feeds consumption and survival, not the amassing of wealth).
88. Large-scale bribes are paid for major dispensations, the prerogative of high-level
public officials. Even in the poorest nations, high-level officials receive pay above subsis-
tence levels.
89. One frequently cited example is the police in Mexico. Moskos reports that "[tihe
yearly salary of a police officer in Mexico City is about $4,500, low not simply by Ameri-
can standards but even by Mexico's, where the average blue-collar income is $7,900."
Charles Moskos, How to Clean Up Foreign Militaries: Subsidize and Control Their Pay and
Pensions, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1997-Jan. 5, 1998, at 51, 52.
90. See Julie B. Nesbit, Note, Transnational Bribery of Foreign Officials: A New Threat
to the Future of Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1273, 1293 (1998) (noting the
frequency with which low-paid public officials in developing nations accept bribes).
91. The logical connection between poor pay for public officials and government
graft has been borne out over centuries and may be an outgrowth of systems where
official positions were purchased from the state or crown. See Felipe Fernandez-
Armesto, So is Corruption Really Just a Vice of the Latin Nations?, INDep. (London), Mar.
19, 1999, at 3 (observing that where public positions were purchased, office holders
"had to exploit [their positions] for all they could get").
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 33
motivated by greed in seeking relatively small-scale payments. These latter
cases may be attributable to a cumulative effect; an adequately paid public
official may amass a sizable discretionary income by collecting numerous
small bribes.92 For present purposes, if public officials are paid a subsis-
tence salary or higher, their motivation should be classified as greed, not
need.
Corruption based on need reflects a socio-structural problem, argua-
bly better addressed by fixing the problem than by criminalizing its
effects.93 Because the motives of food, shelter, and survival are basic and
compelling,94 problems of need will likely prove resistant to legal solutions
that ignore the underlying exigencies. Although paying all public officials
subsistence wages or better may be a daunting goal in some developing
nations, achieving that goal would eliminate officials' economic need and
the entire corresponding class of bribes motivated by that need.95 Indeed,
Singapore's campaign to pay public officials adequate wages may contrib-
ute in part to the nation's low levels of bribery.
96
Flanders accurately classifies poverty-induced bribery as a structural
problem, describing its historical context:
[A] corrupting influence of some structural adjustment policies con-
cerns public sector pay. Governments have often been pressed... to reduce
borrowing by cutting the public sector wage bill. Since severance and other
conditions make it hard to cut employee numbers quickly, this has often
meant sharp declines in real public sector pay.
9 7
92. Consider, for example, Karichi, Pakistan's police chiefs, estimated by a senior
official to receive an average $10,000 a month in bribes and extortion. See John
Stackhouse, Pakistan Limps from Bad to Worse: Debt, Feudal Conditions Keep Country in
Crisis, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 9, 1996, at Al. Although police chiefs do not
receive the large-scale bribes garnered by high-level government officials who have con-
trol over government contracts, they make substantial sums-amounts beyond the range
of subsistence-and, therefore, are motivated by greed.
93. Corruption motivated by greed arguably may also have socio-cultural founda-
tions. For example, one could argue that the deterioration of morals and secularization
of society are systemic forces that support corruption among the greedy. Corruption
motivated by greed cannot be rectified, however, by socio-economic policies that address
corruption motivated by need.
94. See A. H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 82-83 (1954) (explaining how
unsatisfied physiological needs eclipse the operation of higher levels of human develop-
ment, including "[flreedom, love, community feeling, respect, [and] philosophy").
95. See John Hogarth, Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Bribery of
Officials in Pursuit of Corporate Aims, 6 CrmM. L.F. 557, 573 (1995) (tying adequate gov-
ernment worker salaries to reduced vulnerability to bribery); Daniel Y. Jun, Note, Brib-
ery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071, 1115 (1996) (positing increased public employee salaries
as a means of reducing the incidence of bribery).
96. See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 26, at 755-56 (observing that in Asia, "[o]nly
Singapore, having established a government agency to stop corruption and actually
enforce the laws it passes, as well as adequately paying its officials, has remained free
from scandal").
97. Stephanie Flanders, Clear Thinking on Corruption: Rich Countries Cannot Solve
the Problem by Mere Decree, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 1997, at 10.
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As noted earlier, the FCPA makes no express distinctions98 between
grand and petty bribery.99 Likewise, it does not distinguish bribery moti-
vated by greed and bribery motivated by need.100 The statute's prohibi-
tions and penalties are not affected in any formal way by the size or motive
of a bribe. This indifference to significant variables creates sub-optimal
policy. While motive should not be distinguished formally,' 0 ' bribe size, a
correlate of motive, should be expressly classified by legislation.
The preceding Section presented two critiques of extraterritorial legis-
lation as applied to petty bribery: (1) the potential for moral imperialism is
higher in cases of petty bribery; and (2) petty bribery is less pernicious
than grand bribery, not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. A third
critique emerges from the present analysis: motivated by need, much petty
bribery will resist legal controls and is better addressed by socio-structural
change. In short, legislation against petty bribery risks substantial cross-
cultural and transnational overreaching, while yielding few, if any, social
benefits.102 Accordingly, U.S. laws and the multilateral arrangements pat-
terned after those laws should be modified to distinguish between grand
and petty bribery. Section IV further explains and justifies this
recommendation.
II. The Supply and Demand Sides of Corruption
Corruption has a supply side and a demand side. Accordingly, there are
supply-side solutions and demand-side solutions. The supply side of brib-
ery concerns the offer or payment of a bribe.103 A supply-side solution
discourages a prospective bribe-giver from offering or paying a bribe. The
demand side of bribery concerns the acceptance of or request for a
bribe. 10 4 A demand-side solution discourages a prospective bribe-taker
from accepting or requesting a bribe.10 5 Traditionally, legislation has
focused on the supply side, perhaps in response to the difficulty of manag-
98. Express distinctions differ from any implied distinctions that may be used unof-
ficially by the DOJ and the SEC in enforcement of the statute. See supra notes 59-72 and
accompanying text.
99. See supra Part L.A.
100. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (Supp. 1999) (prohibiting any "offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value").
101. As law does not formally excuse theft actuated by need, it should not formally
excuse bribery actuated by need.
102. See Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Comment, Revisiting Corrupt Practices from a Mar-
ket Perspective, 12 EMORY IN'L L. Rzv. 1021, 1023 (1998) (describing the FCPA's main
flaws as difficulty circumscribing corrupt behavior and imposition of "culturally spe-
cific values," perceived as an intrusion on sovereignty).
103. See William M. Daley, Bribery: No Longer Business as Usual, FIN. TiMEs, Feb. 15,
1999, at 10.
104. See id.
105. See Brademas & Heimann, supra note 5, at 21 (defining the demand side as
"extortion and other forms of corruption by public officials" and noting the difficulty of
demand-side reforms).
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ing the "country-specific" demand side of bribery. 10 6
The proliferation of open markets naturally correlates with increased
concern regarding corruption. Free markets, transactional transparency,
and anti-bribery initiatives combine into a powerful tool for fighting both
the supply and demand sides of bribery.10 7 Historically, however, extrater-
ritorial legislation has focused exclusively on the supply side.' 08 Examin-
ing supply-side and demand-side solutions to transnational bribery, this
Section argues that increasing emphasis to the demand side may prove
both desirable and effective.
A. Free Markets, Increased Openness, and Anti-Bribery Initiatives
The reality of globalized free trade' 0 9 takes several forms. Previously
socialist or communist nations are embracing free markets, albeit gradu-
ally. 110 Regional clusters of nations are making commitments to reduce
impediments and national barriers to trade."' Examples include the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)" l 2 and the European
Union's currency convergence efforts, embodied in the euro.113
106. SeeJEFFREY P. BIALOs & GREGORY HusiSIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 157 (1997).
107. Bill Emmott aptly summarizes the nexus among these modern dynamics:
If you open your country up, and choose to bind yourself closer to others, this
increases your citizens' freedom of choice and of movement. Increased access to
information inevitably exposes your remaining economic, social or political ine-
qualities to scrutiny. Once people know what they are being deprived of, they
start to care more about it. That brings change, and openness brings change
more rapidly across your borders, wave after wave.
Bill Emmott, The 2 0h Century: Semi-Integrated World, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999, at S41.
108. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (Supp. 1999);
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1; see also United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831,
835-36 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting Congress's intent, in drafting the FCPA, to exempt from
prosecution foreign officials receiving bribes).
109. See generally Sherrill Tapsell, One World- Ready or Not, NEW ZEALAN'D MGMT.,
Feb. 1999, at 40.
110. See Blanka Kalinova, Trade Liberalisation in the Transition Economies, OECD
OBsERVER, Apr.-May 1998, at 15 (observing "[t]he adoption of market-led and outward-
oriented economic systems in the formerly communist countries of central and eastern
Europe").
111. These commitments include generic economic programs, as well as criminal
sanctions for bribery. The European Union has been particularly effective in shaping
regional and global economic policies and was influential in setting the "critical policy
issues" for the OECD Convention. See Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emer-
gence of an International Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Ameri-
cas, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 53, 77 (Supp. 1999).
112. See Marc Selinger, Briton Urges NAFTA Expansion to Eastern Europe, KNIGHT-RID-
DER/TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Oct. 22, 1998, available in INFOTRAC (noting the importance of
NAFTA as an adjunct to free trade and reporting British Parliament member David
Davis's recommendation that it be extended to cover newly emerging markets in Eastern
Europe).
113. For discussion of the euro's adoption and impact on world markets, see Stanley
Reed, Now the Dollar has a Co-Star on the World Stage, Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1999, at 36;
Thane Peterson et al., Europe Rising: Restructuring and the Euro May Soon Make It
America's Equal, Bus. WK., Feb. 8, 1999, at 68; Europe's New Currency: Gambling on the
Euro, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, at 19.
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Free markets form part of a dynamic process of global transformation.
They function both as causes of change and effects of larger worldwide
trends. Specifically within the context of the war against corruption, grow-
ing freedom, openness, and development of markets play a natural, positive
reformatory role. 1
14
Michael Almond and Scott Syfert discuss the interdependence of free
trade, open markets, and increased concern regarding the costs of brib-
ery.115 They explain the relationship between these trends by observing
that "honesty, transparency, and fair-dealing," the hallmarks of anti-cor-
ruption efforts, are also essential to free markets. 116 Governments and
coalitions support openness and battle corruption because they consider
these efforts essential to their own economic interests. 117 Regional open-
ness confers strategic advantage, creating competitive pressure toward
global openness. 1 8 As this Section explains, the openness and trans-
parency of increasingly free global markets encourage rectitude on both
the supply side and the demand side of the bribery equation.
B. Supply-Side Reform
Openness illuminates corrupt transactions. As Lucinda Low and Kathryn
Atkinson observe, "Increasingly open markets and societies ... invite[ I
unprecedented media coverage of corruption-be it perceived or real-that
is hampering their progress." 1 9 Within this climate, firms that embrace
transparency and integrity develop a valuable asset.' 20 Stated most sim-
ply, these virtues attract business.' 2 ' Companies that have high standards
of conduct and embrace transparency and accountability draw more inter-
national business transactions. 122 Conversely, bribe-payers are more likely
114. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impe-
tus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM.
Bus. .J. 485, 485-86 (2000) (noting connection between the OECD Convention and the
organization's broader goals of "sound economic expansion and development").
115. See Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corpo-
rate Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. IIfrr'L L. &
CoM. REG. 389, 391 (1997).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
118. See Isaac Cohen, The Road to Integration, LA-IN FIN., Sept. 1997, (Supp.), at 7, 8
(relating regional liberalization of trade to the development of increasingly open world
trading).
119. Lucinda A. Low & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, Led by the U.S., the World Wages
War on Corruption, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 3, 1997, at B9, B14.
120. See Skip Kaltenheuser, The Real Cost of Doing Business, WORLD TRADEJune 1997,
at 80 ("'[C]ompanies that believe strongly in integrity and transparency build credibility
and reputations of excellence that ultimately attract new business and opportunities
worldwide ... ' (quoting Frank Vogl, a vice president of Transparency International)).
121. See Paul Blustein, Pssst. Here's a Little Something That Seems to Slow Growth,
WASH. PosT, July 17, 1996, at D1 (noting relatively high rates of investment in countries
with little corruption).
122. See Im Hong-jae, Convention on Combating Bribery, KoREA HERALD, Dec. 24,
1998, at 6 (noting the increasing importance of transparency and accountability in the
global economy and observing that companies increasingly demand a "level playing
field" before making an international investment).
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to be identified as corrupt, and therefore more likely to be shunned than
ever before.123 The growing role of reputation in increasingly open world
markets will encourage self-monitoring by businesses in information-rich
cultures.
These dynamics have serious social ramifications. Individuals and
firms that pay bribes in an open society eventually may be exposed, suffer-
ing reputational injury.124 Public disgust over corruption is escalating
around the world, 125 and technology is driving rapid, widespread dissemi-
nation of information, 126 fueling public ire. 127 From a public policy
standpoint, reputational harm to individuals or companies is becoming an
increasingly potent incentive to conduct global business with integrity.128
These long-term dynamics discourage companies from offering and
paying bribes 129 and help counteract the competitive advantages of bribe-
paying in individual transactions. 130 Moreover, the weight'of extant extra-
territorial laws reinforces naturally occurring open-market incentives, at
123. See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL.
L. REv. 959, 968 & n.34 (1999) (noting the effect of shame and reputational harm in
business contexts where bribes are given). Once openness and transparency facilitate
identification of corrupt transactions, the bribe-payer's reputation for rectitude suffers,
and other firms incorporate this factor into their decision-making when they evaluate
partners for collaboration, trading, and other business transactions.
124. See Norman Givant, The Sword that Shields: The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Can Protect US Firms Doing Business in China, CHINA Bus. REv., May-June 1994, at 29
(noting that "[oinly the foolish would be willing to risk their reputations" by complying
with requests for illicit favors or bribes).
125. See Peter Montagnon, Public Turning Against the Use of Bribery, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1998, at 7.
126. See Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End
Corruption in International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 108, 109 (1998)
(tying corruption critiques that receive global attention to the diffusion of technology
such as fax, telephony, satellite television, and the Internet).
127. See A. Timothy Martin, The Development of International Bribery Law, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T 95, 102 (1999) ("The increasing speed and availability of global
communication (e.g., CNN and the Internet) have resulted in growing dissatisfaction in
many countries with ... corruption."); Gary Andrew Poole, Despots Find Dissidents on
Internet Hard to Muzzle, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 1999, at 15A (reporting Internet grassroots
protest movements against corruption in various countries).
128. See Montagnon, supra note 125, at 7 (noting "an upsurge of public revulsion
against corruption," as well as the negative effect that Internet campaigns can have on a
corporation's image).
129. While reputational dynamics are an effective market force discouraging bribery,
there are other market factors; for example, bribe-givers risk the possibility that courts
will refuse to honor bribery-corrupted contracts. See HARALD SCHLOTER, THE RISKS OF
BRIBERY IN BusINEss: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL EFFECTs OF BRIBERY ON THE MAIN-
CONTRACT IN GERmANY, ENGLAND AND SPAIN (Transparency Int'l Working Paper, Mar. 18,
1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/work-papers/validitycontracts.html>.
130. In addition to receiving individual contracts, bribe-payers may also benefit in
individual transactions by purchasing entry barriers to be imposed on competitors. See
Pinaki Bose, Industrial Licensing, Bribery and Allocation Efficiency, 47 BULL. ECON. REs.
85, 85 (1995) ("In less developed countries where an individual licensing policy governs
the entry of new firms, and when government officials awarding these licenses are cor-
rupt, an incumbent firm may deter entry by bribing the official to deny the license.").
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least on the supply side. 131 On the supply side, law harmonizes with
structural change, providing a mutually supportive public-policy web that
combats corruption. As discussed in the following Section, open-market
dynamics also discourage demand-side bribery, but no complementary
legal sanctions exist.
C. Demand-Side Reform
As with the supply side of bribery, the proliferation of free markets world-
wide is also likely to have a healthy preventive effect on the demand side of
bribery-the public officials who may be tempted to request or accept illicit
payments. Companies engaged in bribery are not the only victims of cam-
paigns against corruption. Countries where corrupt officials thrive also
are likely to suffer reputational harm. Foreign investors avoid opportuni-
ties in nations like China,132 where bribery of public officials flour-
ishes.133 Accordingly, countries seeking to encourage investment have an
incentive to explore openness reforms. 134 Each iteration of market free-
dom operates as an agent of change, encouraging others to join the
trend.13 ' At the same time, each iteration of market freedom results from
the existing, freely-competitive forces. Consequently, a cycle of ever-grow-
ing reforms moves toward greater freedom, openness, and transactional
rectitude worldwide. 13
6
131. See, e.g., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-1 to -2 (Supp.
1999) (prohibiting the payment, but not the receipt, of bribes); Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (operating against supplying bribes, not against demanding bribes).
For the reasoning behind the OECD's supply-side orientation, see OECD Bribery Conven-
tion, MIDDLE E. ExEctmvE REP., Dec. 1998, at 9 ("The OECD said that it seemed logical to
start with the 'supply' side of bribery because OECD multinationals are the largest
exporters of trade and investment in the world, representing by far the greatest potential
source of bribe money.").
132. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Modest Forecasts for U.S. Shift Focus Overseas, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at C3 (connecting reduced prospects for U.S. investment in China
with China's rampant corruption).
133. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further
Research, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1998, at 11, 12 (stating corruption reduces investment
incentives).
134. See James Cox, Asia Shakes Up Cozy, Corrupt Business Practices, USA TODAY, Jan.
28, 1998, at 4B (reporting that financial markets have punished governments that can-
not demonstrate transparency and fairness in transactions).
135. See Nora M. Rubin, Note, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb
Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of
the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and Switzer-
land, 14 Am. U. Iur'L L. REv. 257, 261 (1998) ("In the nineties, the soaring volume of
trade and international business transactions contributes to the increased awareness of,
and agitation about, corrupt transnational business practices.").
136. While this process makes sense in theory, its practical realization will take time.
Cynthia Kemper notes, for example, "Democracy and economic reform were supposed to
have catalyzed the elimination and temptation of bribery worldwide. But new reports
over the last year show corruption is far from dead." Cynthia Kemper, Old-Fashioned
Bribery is Alive and Well in New Global Businesses, DENVER PosT, Apr. 20, 1997, at H5.
This lag is hardly surprising; it is highly implausible that natural market incentives
toward open, honest dealing would have an immediate universal effect.
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This result stems from the axiom that free and open markets are inter-
dependent and mutually reinforcing. 13 7 Reducing border impediments
and permitting capitalists to operate without restriction ultimately will
unify market economies around the world.13 8 When this happens, market
forces will become global factors, less regional or national in scope.
139
Barry O'Keefe accurately describes the effects of this change on the per-
spective of companies and countries regarding bribery:
Many governments are recognising that if they want their countries to
develop and secure long term economic growth by attracting foreign invest-
ment, accessing loans for government projects and the expansion of their
own local industries so that they can compete on the international market,
they need to be able to demonstrate that they are making significant efforts
to fight against corruption at all levels, and to develop an environment in
which a high standard of ethics and bureaucratic efficiency can be
expected.
140
Systemic anti-corruption efforts are thriving due to these competitive
dynamics. These efforts are evident in the recent transparency initiatives
that support demand-side reform.14 1 Imposing transactional candor on
public officials creates a powerful tool with enormous potential to promote
change. This potential derives from the nature of public posts. Public offi-
cials work in arenas subject to influence by public opinion. 14 2 Accord-
ingly, when institutions are transparent and public accountability thrives,
public officials are susceptible to threats and incentives.1 4 3
137. This interdependence has serious ramifications. President Clinton remarked
that "as the world grows more interdependent, it is unrealistic'to think that there will be
an international economic policy with rules unrelated to an emerging international con-
sensus on the environment and an international consensus on labor." Clinton Says Fail-
ure to Launch Trade Round Due to 'Real Differences', AFX EUR. Focus, Dec. 9, 1999,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
138. For example, Roy MacLaren notes that "transatlantic free trade could revitalize
the totality of the global system-and begin the critical process of bridging potentially
exclusionary blocks." Roy MacLaren, Canada Calls for a Giant Transatlantic Free Trade
Bloc, 9 CAN. SPEECHES No. 3, June 1995, at 29, 30.
139. See, e.g., Alex Brummer, Hey, Big Spender, GuARDIAN (London), Jan. 21, 1998, at
15 (noting interdependence of nations in a global economy, such that Asia's problems
become Britain's problems).
140. Barry O'Keefe, Under the Table or Above-Board?: Responding to International Cor-
ruption, Aus'L. Acct., Oct. 1997, at 26.
141. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
142. The extent to which public opinion influences officials varies substantially. In
free-market economies supported by democratic political institutions, public opinion
significantly influences officials. In contrast, public opinion has less influence over
public officials in dictatorships and totalitarian states. If public officials' behavior in
dictatorships is open and transparent, however, the threats of political instability and
uprising can have some effect on how public officials behave. Accordingly, if post-Cold
War trends continue to move toward more open and democratic markets, more nations
will fall under the influence of meaningful rather than ineffectual courts of public
opinion.
143. See A Global War Against Bribery, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1999, at 22 ("[Tio the
extent that corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain, its perpetrators have
one foot in the legitimate world; they are thus within reach of incentives or threats-such
as removal from office-that may persuade them to change their ways.").
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Consider, for example, Transparency International's' 4 4 drive to estab-
lish so-called "bribe-free zones," or "islands of integrity"-places where
public commitments are made to eschew paying or receiving bribes.
145
Ancillary commitments to maintain open transactional records, potentially
scrutinized by journalists, help preserve integrity and expose violators.
14 6
Transparency discourages bribe-giving because exposure imperils future
participation in public contracting processes with any country demanding
transactional transparency. 14 7 Perhaps more importantly, public exposure
discourages bribe-taking because revelation of corruption threatens gov-
ernment officials with removal from office 14 8 and criminal prosecution
under domestic laws.
14 9
These observations suggest three propositions. First, natural eco-
nomic forces in free, interdependent global markets create a strong incen-
tive for countries and companies to address internally the problem of
transnational bribery.150 Accordingly, the movement toward globalized
free trade effects a structural change that fosters anti-corruption reforms,
even without legislation. Second, growing interdependence, particularly in
regional or affinity-based free-market alliances, will weaken objections to
global anti-corruption initiatives, even legislative solutions.' 5 ' Free mar-
kets encourage cross-fertilization of national and cultural ideas, attitudes,
norms, beliefs, and value systems.' 5 2 As this trend leads gradually to
144. Transparency International is an anti-corruption coalition with chapters world-
wide. Supported by corporations, government, and academics, it engages in research to
understand and eliminate bribery globally. See Michael Kantor, Remarks (July 25,
1996), in Remarks of Secretary of Commerce Michael Kantor, FDCH FED. DEP'T & AGENCY
DocUmENTs, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDDOC file, at 8-9.
145. Who Will Listen to Mr. Clean?, ECONoMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 52 [hereinafter Who
Will Listen?].
146. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, THE TI SOURCE BOOK 75-84 (Jeremy Pope ed., 2d ed.
1997), available at Transparency Int'l, The TI Source Book (last modified Sept. 18, 1996)
<http://www.transparency.de/documents/source-book/index.html> (recommending
transparency practices and observing the media's role in fostering public awareness of
corruption, which heightens support for reform).
147. See Who Will Listen, supra note 145, at 52.
148. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 146, at 81 (describing effective public infor-
mation programs, built on transparency, as sending the message that corrupt officials
will be dismissed).
149. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 122-23
(1990) (describing the prosecution of high-level Japanese public officials for a Lockheed
bribery scandal revealed by SEC filings).
150. Internal action refers to domestic transparency procedures, and perhaps also
domestic sanctions for corrupt practices. Focus on internal reform implies that market
pressures provide countries with substantial incentives to monitor domestic activities,
making extraterritorial legislation unnecessary.
151. See Paul Blustein, IMF, World Bank Target Third-World Bribery, WASH. POST, Oct.
4, 1996, at D3 ("A growing number of political leaders, scholars and activists-in both
industrialized and poor countries-are condemning bribery, not only as morally wrong
but as a severe impediment to economic progress.").
152. This cross-fertilization may be especially important in the areas of corruption
and anti-corruption norms. Claire Moore Dickerson states, "[C]orrupt behavior...
takes on a life of its own, and can infect and destroy an existing honesty norm." Claire
Moore Dickerson, Political Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L.
393, 393 (1999). Given this relationship, the effect of free markets on corruption could
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global convergence,15 3 anti-corruption initiatives will incorporate transna-
tional concessions forged by global interdependence and alliance. Finally,
legislative reforms can and should reinforce the structural reforms occur-
ring worldwide in response to open markets. If multilateral laws such as
the OECD Convention become advisable,' 5 4 legislators should adopt
demand-side prohibitions of bribe-taking to complement extant supply-
side prohibitions of bribe-giving.
III. Limitations of Legal Edict in Combating International Bribery and
Corruption
A. Conceptual Problems with Fighting Bribery by Legal Decree
If corruption is firmly rooted in institutional foundations, fighting it by
legal decree is naive. Legal sanctions for corrupt behavior do not address
the entrenched political, social, and economic causes of corruption.'
55
Where the causes of bribery remain intact, some bribe-payers and bribe-
takers will consider criminal prosecution a necessary risk-for example, to
avoid poverty.' 5 6 Moreover, the risk may be minimal because law enforce-
ment agencies worldwide are unlikely to have the resources to identify and
effectively prosecute even a fraction of the typically covert violations.
157
Logistical difficulties peculiar to investigating violations of U.S. law
abroad' 58 exacerbate this constraint on prosecution.' 5 9 It is not surpris-
be self-supporting because convergence on shared anti-bribery values reduces corrup-
tion, which reinforces global honesty norms.
153. See Michael Malone, The Great Convergence: An Introduction, FORBES, Oct. 4,
1999, (ASAP Supp.), at 15 (observing a global "new ecumenism" as boundaries melt).
154. See Salbu, supra note 42, at 75-78.
155. As Yerachmiel Kugel and Gladys Gruenberg observe, effective anti-bribery policy
addresses underlying incentives by changing the environments where bribery occurs.
Specifically, the challenge is to "change an environment that generates a pro-payoff
response to one which generates an antipayoff response." YERACHMIEL KUGEL & GuInYs
W. GRUENBERG, INTERNATIONAL PAYoFFs: DILEMMA FOR BUSINESS 127 (1977).
156. See Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist World, 14
CONN. J. INT'L L. 533, 538 (1999) ("[R]ational actors behave opportunistically and will
ignore commitments or rules if the benefit from defection exceeds the cost of
compliance.").
157. See A Rarely Enforced Law, BARRON'S, May 25, 1992, at 14 (noting that the FCPA
has become virtually unenforceable except in the most extreme cases); see also A Global
War Against Bribery, supra note 143, at 22 ("Although under America's anti-bribery law
the penalties can be fearsome .. ., only one case a year on average has actually been
prosecuted.").
158. It is possible that historical logistic problems of transnational investigation will
be mitigated by the cooperation provisions in international accords. For example, the
OECD Convention contains "mutual legal assistance provisions" that, according to one
author, "will enable U.S. authorities to acquire evidence that typically was not obtaina-
ble in the past." Stuart H. Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 33 INT'L LAw. 507, 512
(1999).
159. See NEIL H. JACOBY Er AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINEss: A STUDY OF
CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTs ABROAD 218 (1977) ("U.S. law enforcement officials have
considerable difficulty in obtaining proof of official bribery in the United States. Secur-
ing such proof in a foreign country would be practically impossible.").
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ing that the FCPA has been viewed historically as ineffectual. 160
Individual prosecution is a scattershot solution in comparison to
social change. 16 ' Individual prosecution requires human surveillance and
enforcement, which are potentially expensive, unreliable, and ineffi-
cient.162 In contrast, institutional reform uniformly alters behavior
throughout society. While social change will not expunge all corruption,
behavior eliminated by social reforms is removed systematically, both root
and branch.
In short, extraterritorial legislative solutions have proven ineffectual
and unwieldy.163 While some legal sanctions may have a limited positive
effect, meaningful reform will more likely result from "structural adjust-
ments."'164 Laws cannot completely address corruption embedded in a
nation, its institutions, and its social systems.
B. Experiences Affirming the Conceptual Limitations of Legal Decree
To this point, it has been posited that legislation cannot effectively curb
bribery. Anecdote and experience support the speculation that the FCPA
and other domestic forms of legislation have been ineffectual.165 Consider
160. See, e.g., Kimberley Music, Proposal Being Readied to Help Firms Compete Over-
seas While Obeying U.S. Anti-Bribery Laws, OIL DAILY, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1 (noting the
belief of an oil industry source that the FCPA "doesn't reduce corruption in the foreign
countries").
161. Consider, for example, a recent report that 594 corruption cases are presently
pending in Indonesia. See Government Steps Up Anticorruption Drive, JAICARTA Posr, July
7, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, JKPOST File. Criminal bribery laws are
applied on a case-by-case basis-an expensive process that likely misses many
prosecutable infractions.
162. See JAcOBY ET AL., supra note 159, at 218-19 ("If the United States seriously
intended to enforce a criminal statute outlawing foreign political payments, it would
need to establish a massive surveillance of the foreign activities of U.S. citizens as well as
of foreign politicians and government officials."). As an illustration of the unwieldy,
imprecise, and potentially abusive nature of legislation's implementation in the courts,
consider this description of Hong Kong practice:
The authority to prosecute is reserved to the attorney general, and only a court
can determine guilt. Yet this protection is incomplete. ICAC literature boasts
that many persons have been punished even when there has been inadequate
evidence to prosecute. "What are the corrupt like in Hong Kong?" it asks.
"Over the years the ICAC has uncovered thousands, with the majority of them
eventually brought to justice in the courts. Those who could not be prosecuted for
reasons such as insufficient evidence were quickly flushed out of the public ser-
vice by disciplinary action to prevent them from doing more damage to society."
MaxJ. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combating Corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC, ANA~s
Ahi. AcAD. POL. & Sci., Sept. 1996, at 118, 126 (alteration in original). The author fur-
ther observes, "ICAC's power to search, seize, and compel suspects and witnesses to
divulge information are far in excess of what is customary in liberal democracies." Id. at
125.
163. See Bruce L. Barker, Back Doors to Profit, WASH. PosT, Oct. 4, 1999, at A22 (stat-
ing that the FCPA has "failed in its mission" and observing that expatriate executives
"routinely flout" it).
164. See Flanders, supra note 97.
165. See John S. McClenahen, Bribery Remains Widespread, INDusTRY WK., Oct. 19,
1998, at 16 (noting rampant bribery despite recent anti-corruption efforts, including
legislation).
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the following colorful description of Indonesia's business environment,
where observers view corruption as entrenched:
The business environment in Indonesia can be described as a giant jelly
that traps wealthy businesspeople but sucks out any business ethics, integ-
rity, honesty and morality that they possess.
Once they get in the jelly, life becomes very convenient. But the prob-
lem is, the longer they stay in, the more contaminated they become.
Even blue chip U.S. companies that are supposedly regulated by the
strict code of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cannot overpower the force
of the jelly.
166
While domestic anti-bribery laws 16 7 are ubiquitous, 168 the practice of
bribery has obstinately remained.
169
A sample of research findings 170 confirms the ineffectiveness of anti-
bribery legislation. 1 71 Only a minority of companies surveyed by Mary
Jane Sheffet instituted formal changes in response to the FCPA and subse-
quent amendments. 172 Moreover, according to a recent survey by London
risk consultant Control Risks, "[m]ore than 90 per cent of US company
directors believe their competitors occasionally or regularly use middlemen
to ci'cumvent anti-corruption legislation in competing for contracts in
developing countries."' 73
166. Kwik, supra note 54.
167. For discussion of the U.S. domestic anti-bribery laws, see Suzette Richards &
Robert Warren Topp, Federal Criminal Conflict of Interest, 36 AM. CRM. L. REv. 629, 630-
41 (1999).
168. See Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Regional Market Integration and the
Development of Global Norms for Enterprise Conduct: The Case of International Bribery,
38 Bus. & Soc'Y 415,415 (1999) (calling the proscription of domestic bribery "virtually
universal").
169. David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a
New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 457, 495 (1998).
170. In addition to research documenting the general ineffectiveness of the FCPA,
research exists documenting factors associated with noncompliance. See, e.g., Pekin
Ogan, Predicting Noncompliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 Bus. & PROF.
ETHicsJ. 65 (1995).
171. But see Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globaliza-
tion and Fragmentation, 24 YAI..EJ. INr'L L. 257, 289 n.171 ("The argument that the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act is ineffective because it has not curtailed bribery worldwide
merits almost no response. The majority of transnational transactions do not involve
the United States or U.S. businesses. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cannot be
expected to reach those transactions."). Nichols's contention does not address, however,
the high incidence of bribe paynents by U.S. firms, see infra notes 174-79 and accompa-
nying text, or the ineffectuality of legislation generally, as suggested by the proliferation
of corruption worldwide despite universal domestic anti-bribery laws.
172. Mary Jane Sheffet, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did They Change Corporate Behavior?, 14 J. PUB. POL'Y &
MA= NG 290, 294-300 (1995).
173. Montagnon, supra note 125, at 7. Use of middlemen does not exonerate a firm
from liability under the FCPA, which extends to acts perpetrated by the firm's agents.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. 1999). Presumably, using middlemen
may still help companies circumvent the law by making violations more difficult to
trace.
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If both the FCPA and domestic laws in foreign countries have failed to
have any serious impact on bribery,' 74 is there any reason to assume that
additional legislation would have a greater effect? The possibility exists
that corruption's robust structural underpinnings render the problem, at
least under certain conditions, resistant to legal controls.' 75 This assertion
does not suggest that laws are entirely ineffectual in combating bribery.
Rather, law serves a very limited role,1 7 6 and the limitations of statutes
need to be understood and incorporated into public policy. 177 The most
likely benefit of legislation is convincing the world that bribery and cor-
ruption are serious problems. 178 The FCPA and the OECD Convention
probably have symbolic value: they heighten global awareness of corrup-
tion.17 9 Otherwise, their role in effecting social change is questionable.
174. Timothy Martin describes domestic laws as "often confusing and sometimes
even contradictory" and applied "arbitrarily and inconsistently." Martin, supra note 127,
at 102. The effectiveness of legislation such as the FCPA can never be proven because
controlled experimentation cannot be done. Any experiment would need to compare
global corruption in the world with and without anti-bribery legislation. In reality, these
worlds are mutually exclusive, so no controlled context exists for comparison. Accord-
ingly, declines in corruption during the life of legislation could not be attributed to the
statutes because any comparison cannot control for extraneous variables, such as pres-
sure from private watchdogs and increased effectiveness of reputational pressure. Simi-
larly, if corruption levels remain constant or grow after the enactment of legislation, no
conclusion can be extrapolated that the legislation is ineffective. Once a state passes
legislation, no one will ever know what the trends in bribery would have been absent the.
law.
175. One can argue that the FCPA yielded relatively poor results because it has been
only a unilateral effort until recently. Under this theory, U.S. companies resisted the
legislation because of the competitive dynamic created by unrestricted foreign compa-
nies. If this premise is true, then the multilateralization of the FCPA will reduce those
competitive pressures, thereby improving legislative compliance. This result would
render the concept of extraterritorial legislation potentially more effective.
While this alternative theory is not only plausible but also somewhat appealing, it is
limited. Logically, at least some of the resistance to legislation is due to the structural
inadequacies of legal solutions. Furthermore, even if full multilateralization of the FCPA
would improve compliance, universal adoption is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
176. See GEORGE C. GREANLAs & DuANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CoRRUr PRAcica s
Acr: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 53 (1982) (noting conclusion of the Ford Administration
task force that a criminal anti-bribery law would play the limited role of "policy asser-
tion" because it would be difficult or impossible to enforce).
177. For a good, detailed discussion of these limitations, seeJAcOBY ET AL., supra note
159, at 215-20.
178. See Nigel Page, Consensus for Zero Tolerance, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 1999, at 8
(acknowledging the dearth of prosecutions under the FCPA and suggesting that the
OECD Convention may at least have the benefit of prompting companies to monitor
employees).
179. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts
Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 17 (1999)
(crediting the FCPA with increasing awareness of and shaping global attitudes toward
corruption).
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IV. Policy Implications and Recommendations
The preceding Section suggested that legal sanctions for bribery have been
largely ineffectual in the war against corruption. This failure may not be
the only shortcoming of using legal edict. Extraterritorial criminalization
of bribery also exacts significant social costs, including moral imperial-
ism °80 and transnational friction. 18 ' While the world is approaching the
day when legislation may be desirable, that day has not arrived.'
8 2
Although a multilateral FCPA may not currently be advisable, it is a
political reality.' 8 3 Accordingly, some of the following policy recommen-
dations seek to reduce the negative by-products of anti-bribery legislation
by refining or otherwise improving the laws. Building on observations
from Section I, one important refinement of existing legislation would miti-
gate moral imperialism: restricting the scope of extraterritorial criminal
legislation to grand bribery. Building on Section Il's analysis, a further
improvement would modify legislation and public policies to address the
demand side of the corruption equation.
A. If Adopted Globally, Extraterritorial Legislation Should Apply to
Grand Bribery, But Not Petty Bribery
On its face, the FCPA does not distinguish between grand and petty brib-
ery.18 4 The cases prosecuted to date, however, are all relatively large-scale
bribes, ranging from tens of thousands to millions of dollars.'8 5 Enforce-
ment for lesser violations is almost non-existent.
This history of prosecutorial discretion, however, is not binding; it is
simply past practice. The legislation remains facially enforceable against
all magnitudes of bribery, and it has potential effects on actors making
18 6
or considering making' 8 7 small payments, or tendering small gifts, gratui-
ties, meals, and entertainment.' 88 Theoretically, the FCPA can be applied
to those small-scale items that are most difficult to categorize as either legit-
180. See Salbu, supra note 35, at 227-32.
181. See Steven tR Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Har-
mony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 433-37 (1999).
182. See Salbu, supra note 42, at 75-78.
183. See Hotchkiss, supra note 126, at 108 (noting that, despite criticism, more coun-
tries are likely to enact FCPA-style restrictions); Nichols, supra note 171, at 259 ("[Tlhe
prevailing climate favors the criminalization of transnational bribery.").
184. See supra Part I.A.2. As noted earlier, the line between grand and petty bribery
must ultimately be arbitrary, but is fixed for discussion purposes at $1000. See id.
185. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
186. The effect on actors who tender payment is possible prosecution.
187. The effect on actors who consider but ultimately reject tendering payment is
complex. It includes a chilling effect on legitimate behavior, potential loss of business,
potential alienation of public officials, and potential injury to international relations via
the systematic alienation of public officials.
188. See Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against
International Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
6 PAc. RiM L. & POL'YJ. 549, 578 (1997) (observing that "given the expansive nature of
the FCPA," gifts or payments of ttokkap-traditional Korean gifts of hospitality or grati-
tude-to Korean officials are likely to be actionable).
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imate or unlawful.189
In the world of international business, where pluralism is touted and
prized as a key to success,1 90 transnational anti-bribery legislation can
place a businessperson in an untenable position. Risking violation of the
criminal laws in their own country, businesspersons must correctly assess
the legitimacy of apparently reasonable, or at least plausible, fees
demanded or requested by a public official in a host country. 19 1 This con-
flict will cause the risk-averse to act conservatively, moderating their
behavior to ensure compliance with legislation. The conservative actor
may reject the tendering of legitimate payments because of differences in
culture and customs and difficulties categorizing payments under the rele-
vant legislation. Unfortunately, the overreaching of extraterritorial laws
creates moral and political hazards for international businesspersons.
The hazard of moral imperialism is more pertinent to petty bribery
than grand bribery. Extreme cases of grand bribery illustrate this proposi-
tion. It is not controversial to identify as corrupt the highest payment pros-
ecuted through 1995 under the FCPA, a $9.9 million kickback;192 opinions
around the world are unlikely to differ. That lavish payment could not
serve any of the potentially legitimate social functions that justify smaller
payments, such as expression of gratitude and loyalty, symbolic expression
of transactional compatibility, entertainment, hospitality, etiquette, and
protocol.193 A grand bribe payer, regardless of country or culture, knows
that the payment is illegal and violates universal norms.
194
Compare the recent practice in China where thirty-eight Beijing
McDonald's outlets were subject to minor "fees for . . . river dredging,
flower displays on public holidays, and the spiritual well-being programme
of President Jiang Zemin."' 95 Like many smaller-scale assessments, the
fees' legitimacy is more ambiguous to a prospective payer than more bla-
tant large-scale bribes. While a multi-million dollar bribe cannot reasona-
bly serve many legitimate government or social functions, the opposite
holds true for lesser bribes-the smaller the bribe, the greater the array of
legitimate purposes it may serve. 196
189. See supra text accompanying note 72.
190. See Anil Gupta & Vijay Govindaranjan, Mastering Global Business-Success is All
in the Mindset, Bus. DAY (S. Mr.), May 17, 1999, at 2 ("Companies that want to operate
globally must... open themselves to cultural diversity .... ").
191. George Greanias and Duane Windsor explain that this assessment is so difficult
because what constitutes an acceptable, customary payment in one culture may be con-
sidered corrupt in another culture. See GRaEAlNAs & WiNusoR, supra note 176, at 129-30.
192. See Martin, supra note 65, at 425.
193. For discussion of these legitimate functions, see Salbu, supra note 35, at 235-40.
194. Virtually all discussion of the ubiquity of anti-bribery norms makes no distinc-
tion between grand and petty bribery. See, e.g., Fritz F. Heimann, Should Foreign Bribery
Be a Crime? (Sept. 20, 1994) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/source-book/c/
cvI/i9.html5. Yet the argument of universality applies less persuasively to petty pay-
ments, for which alternative, socially acceptable rationales more likely exist.
195. Montagnon, supra note 125, at 7.
196. SeeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 159, at 221 (discussing early rejections of multilat-
eral anti-bribery agreements because of the difficulty distinguishing criminal payments
and proper fees).
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The situation is even more complicated because legitimate functions
may be mixed with illicit purposes 197 and the two may be virtually impos-
sible to distinguish.198 Rather than untangle a complex alien socio-eco-
nomic structure, a businessperson may err on the side of caution, in
situations where payment would have ultimately proved legal and ethically
defensible. At the extreme, the individual may decline to conduct business
in the country. From a policy perspective, either behavior pattern is
undesirable.
The size of the payment demanded is a critical factor in deciding when
governments should regulate a particular behavior. In the China example,
it would be reasonable for an outsider to believe that nominal or even mod-
erate fees for river dredging are imposed legitimately via franchise assess-
ments. As the fees grow, however, the plausibility of public approval for the
scheme diminishes.
In this context of uncertainty, applying extraterritorial criminal sanc-
tions against petty bribery is troublesome. Does a U.S. business have to
second-guess how China raises revenue for the dredging of rivers?199 How
does a U.S. businessperson evaluate whether government-sponsored spiri-
tual well-being programmes are an officially sanctioned, lingering vestige
of China's Cultural Revolution?200 World leaders are demanding recogni-
tion that legitimate government functions need not be identical across cul-
tures.201 Yet by demanding extraterritorial exercise of power, current
multilateral anti-bribery conventions undermine this end.
In sum, ethical ambiguity regarding payments is disproportionately
the domain of petty bribery. This conclusion suggests that initiatives such
as the OECD Convention, modeled after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
are less objectionable when applied only to large-scale bribery. Since
smaller-scale payments, tokens, gratuities, and hospitalities are difficult to
characterize with certainty as either corrupt or innocuous across cul-
tures,202 prosecution of petty bribery substantially heightens the risk of
moral imperialism.
197. For example, commissions may be legitimate, but if excessive, they can also be
tainted. See BASCHE, supra note 79, at 12.
198. See JOHN T. NooNAN, JR., BRIBES 687 (1984) (noting the absence of satisfactory
criteria for distinguishing bribes from the many reciprocal exchanges that are accepted
as legitimate).
199. One might suggest that prudent businesspersons learn about the cultures in
which they plan to conduct business. Despite the wisdom of this recommendation, even
a careful, informed expatriate cannot avoid ambiguities in an unfamiliar culture. Since
small fees may be demanded without warning and under threat of immediate action for
noncompliance, research can never be sufficiently thorough.
200. See Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HAsTINGS COMM. &
Er. Li. 239, 271 (1999) (noting that "spiritual dean-up campaigns" are associated with
China's Cultural Revolution and are "characteristic of Chinese politics").
201. See Tyler Marshall &Jonathan Peterson, Clinton Enjoys Having Catbird Seat, L.A.
TiMEs, June 22, 1997, at A8 ("'We are not holding a competition for the best [economic]
model.... We define our own model.'" (quotingJacques Santer, European Commission
President)).
202. See Salbu, supra note 35, at 248-51.
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In addition, recall earlier observations that (a) extraterritorial anti-
bribery legislation has failed to end or substantially curtail global corrup-
tion20 3 and (b) small bribes may be substantially less pernicious than
large-scale bribes.20 4 Considered in context with a heightened risk of
moral imperialism and international discord, these observations suggest
that extraterritorial legal sanctions against petty bribery yield few social
benefits while imposing potentially serious social costs.
B. Legislation and Public Policy Should Address the Demand Side of
Bribery
Bribery requires two people-a payer and a recipient. These parties respec-
tively form the supply and demand sides of corruption. 205 The FCPA
imposes legal sanctions exclusively on the supply side.20 6 Modern vari-
ants of the FCPA, such as the OECD Convention, perpetuate this traditional
focus on supply instead of demand.20 7
This emphasis on the supply side may reflect nothing more than prag-
matic concerns of implementation and enforcement,208 including the limi-
tations of jurisdiction and precepts of comity. While the United States has
the power to control the global behavior of U.S. firms and their agents,20 9
ordinarily it lacks power over the behavior of foreign officials.210 As a
result, it is easier to control supply than demand through extraterritorial
legislation.21
1
Unfortunately, the FCPA's exclusive focus on the supply side may
ignore the more pressing problems of the demand side of bribery transac-
203. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
205. See Daley, supra note 103, at 10 (referring to bribery in terms of supply and
demand sides).
206. The FCPA applies to groups of potential payers, such as issuers of securities;
domestic concerns; and officers, directors, employees, agents, and stockholders of issu-
ers and domestic concerns. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. 1999). Fur-
ther, the statute only prescribes "an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving
of anything of value" to enumerated recipients. Id.
207. Skip Kaltenheuser, Go As You Pay: An International Attack on the Business of Brib-
ery, BARROW'S, Sept. 28, 1998, at 59.
208. See Ben Richardson & David Murphy, Graft Battle Begins at Home, S. CHINA
MoRN. PosT, Jan. 31, 1999, at 3 ("'[The OECD] decided to do what we could do, which
is to tackle the supply side.'" (quoting Enery Quinones, lead counsel for the OECD's
anti-bribery unit)).
209. See Brown, supra note 39, at 417 (noting the extent of the U.S. government's
extraterritorial reach under the U.S. Constitution).
210. SeeJAcoBY Er AL., supra note 159, at 242 (describing the lack of U.S. power and
influence over foreign governments' activities).
211. Transnational laws that attack the demand side of bribery are feasible, but juris-
dictional impediments create additional hurdles that are not applicable to supply-side
legislation regulating domestic firms. Outlawing foreign officials' acceptance of bribes
would require multilateral treaties that confer the necessary jurisdictional authority.
However, these efforts would prove frustrating. Those nations that would participate in
that kind of treaty arrangement would probably be committed to fighting corruption,
making extraterritorial intervention unnecessary. In contrast, those nations that refuse
to participate may lack a commitment to fight transnational corruption.
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tions.
2 1 2 Many, if not most, instances of corruption may be initiated by
public officials' demands, not offers by prospective payers.2 13 This possi-
bility suggests that the recipient often is the more egregiously culpable
party. It also suggests that focusing on the recipient may more effectively
deter corruption because it addresses a direct cause of many violations.
2 14
Furthermore, recipients are the likely inventors of elaborate systems of
subterfuge to mask the nature of illicit payments. In China, for example,
the practice of "sign flipping" or "pocket swapping" consists of primary
government agencies creating subsidiary agencies that charge clients facili-
tation fees for work with the primary agencies.2 15 It is difficult for foreign
actors to ascertain when these schemes are legitimate and when they con-
ceal garden-variety bribery. Therefore, placing a legal onus on bribe-takers
may be the most promising legal approach to piercing transactional subter-
fuge and achieving meaningful reform.
Legislative focus on the supply side could change in the future, under
the auspices of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACC
or Convention)2 16 recently drafted by the Organization of American States
(OAS). 21 7 Signatories of the IACC commit to criminalizing transnational
bribe-giving. 2 18 Departing significantly from the FCPA model, the IACC
also contains an "illicit enrichment" provision that would criminalize the
demand side of bribery.2 19 However, the IACC permits signatory states to
opt out of the illicit enrichment provision. 220  The United States is
expected to opt out, and it is currently unknown how many other signatory
212. See Christopher F. Corr &Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't?
The OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANS.
NAT'L L. 1249, 1253 (1999) (noting the view of some commentators that bribery is
caused primarily by payees' demands).
213. While speculative, this statement is probably accurate. Bribery descriptions fre-
quently refer to the demands of officials. See, e.g., Chinese Ponder Corruption Probe, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1985, at 4 (noting that "many potential partners or officials [in China]
expect[ ] gifts and other kinds of kick-back as contracts are negotiated").
Moreover, since officials have the transactional power-advantage over contract bid-
ders, it is likely they would be more comfortable broaching the sensitive subject of
bribes. Since the person soliciting bids sets the formal bidding process, it also seems
likely the solicitor would set the unofficial rules.
214. Bribery has both direct, immediate causes and systemic, underlying root-causes.
The latter, which include poverty and underpaid public officials, are important factors
that affect the proliferation of corruption in particular countries. A demand from a
public official is not an underlying or systemic cause. Rather, it is a symptom of institu-
tional problems. Nonetheless, in a legal system that primarily addresses these symp-
toms by criminalizing bribe payment, ignoring bribe-takers leaves a practical
enforcement gap.
215. Mitchell A. Silk, Cracking Down on Economic Crime, CHINA Bus. REv., May-June
1994, at 21, 24-28.
216. Mar. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724.
217. For an overall summary of the IACC's provisions, see Luis F. Jimdnez, The Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, 92 Am. Soc. lNT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 157, 157-62
(1998).
218. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 216, art. VII, 35
I.L.M. at 730.
219. See id. art. IX, 35 I.L.M. at 730-31.
220. See id. arts. VIII, IX, 35 I.L.M. at 730-31.
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nations will follow suit.221
Although the demand side of bribery has proved resistant to extrater-
ritorial legislative authority, it may be susceptible to less formalized reform
of social structures and supporting institutions. Altering the business envi-
ronment to discourage demands for bribes will not be easy. Part of the
challenge derives from the intransigent nature of certain structural
problems that underlie corruption. Low public-sector salaries, for exam-
ple, bear some relation to increased corruption,2 22 especially with low-level
officials.2 23 Yet low pay may be difficult to rectify, if symptomatic of pre-
vailing poverty in a developing nation.2 24 Suggesting higher pay for offi-
cials would be tantamount to suggesting that the answer to bribery is the
elimination of widespread poverty.
While challenging, 225 raising salaries in poor nations is not an insur-
mountable goal. Theoretically, states could rechannel bribe funds into offi-
cials' salaries, transforming the payments into sanctioned forms of
compensation. 22 6 In practice, the problem is not a lack of capital; after all,
bribes cannot exist without the presence of discretionary resources. Even
bribes that take non-monetary forms such as gifts, services, and entertain-
ment must be financed by discretionary cash influx that could be diverted
to legitimate channels. The problem is the informality and inequity of
rules that govern distribution of bribes.2 27 Transactional fees levied fairly
and equitably could increase public officials' salaries to acceptable
levels 228 without simultaneously replicating bribery's corrupt side-effects.
221. See Lucinda A. Low, Transnational Corruption: New Rules for Old Temptations,
New Players to Combat a Perennial Evil, 92 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 151, 154
(1998).
222. See JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, CORRUPTION IN EMPIRIcAL REsEAR H-A REvIEW,
(Transparency Int'l Working Paper, Nov. 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/docu-
ments/work-papers/lanbsdorff_eresearch.html> (referring to several unpublished work-
ing papers that empirically demonstrate the relationship between low public-sector
wages and the rate of corruption).
223. See Magali Matarazzi, Comment, Selecting a Corporate Form: Foreign Direct
Investment in Vietnam's Oil and Gas Industry Under the 1995 Land Law, 19 Nw.J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 364, 375 (1999) ("'Vietnam grants too much discretion to low-level officials.
When combined with low salaries, that fosters corruption."' (quoting Fred Burke, head
of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ho Chi Minh City)).
224. See The Problem With Bribery, 74 HARv. Bus. R-v., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 58 (associ-
ating tolerance of bribery in some developing nations with extremely low salaries of
local bureaucrats).
225. SeeJames P. Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption
Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption
Eruption May Be Capped, 18 Nw. J. Irrk. L. & Bus. 498, 520-21 (1998) (noting difficulty
of raising public servants' salaries in poor countries).
226. See JAcoBY ET AL., supra note 159, at 246.
227. In countries where official salaries are low and bribery rampant, companies
already pay illicit fees to gain some form of advantage. If fees were levied officially and
distributed to government employees in bribe-sensitive positions, the officials' poverty
would diminish, with a corresponding reduction in need-based incentives to demand
bribes.
228. The example of transactional fees is simply illustrative of the general point.
Some people may object to new official transaction costs on transnational commerce.
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Conclusion
FCPA-style legislation will spread globally in the coming decade, as nations
enact laws to comply with multilateral accords such as the OECD Conven-
tion and IACC. 22 9 These laws are imperfect at best and bear substantial
costs. Applied to petty bribery, extraterritorial legislation is especially
undesirable. In regard to small payments, three factors tarnish the legisla-
tion: it is ineffective, it is subject to moral imperialism, and it addresses a
qualitatively less pernicious form of corruption. Accordingly, while extra-
territorial legislation initiatives appear to be an unavoidable reality, their
restrictions should be confined to grand bribery, however ultimately
defined.
Furthermore, extant legislation has focused exclusively on the supply
side of bribery. Yet a large segment of international bribery is likely
spurred by public officials' demands, rather than spontaneous offers by
executives bidding on public contracts. This situation suggests that legal
solutions to international corruption will be more effective if they contain
demand-side provisions, such as the optional provision included in the
IACC.
Finally, although legislative solutions currently appear to be unavoida-
ble, they may be inferior to institutional reforms that work to erode the
foundations that support corrupt practices and regimes. 2 30 Future
research should emphasize this systemic change, particularly examining
structural causes of corruption, including "weak political institutions,
excessive use of patronage and nepotism, lack of accountability, low public
sector salaries and general economic weakness"23 1 as well as "inadequate
management controls and lack of adequate technology for monitoring,
poor recruitment and selection procedures (including nepotism), poor
working conditions and facilities, lack of public information, and generally
inadequate capacity to meet the demand for government services."2 3 2 Ulti-
mately, legislative solutions that ignore these fundamental underpinnings
of corruption will be doomed to failure.
Yet those fees are better than bribes because they do not distort decision-maker judg-
ment or create unfair playing fields.
229. See Stephen H. Willard et al., International Investment, Development, and Priva-
tization, 33 INT'L LAW. 231, 240-41 (1999) (discussing the spread of international anti-
bribery initiatives).
230. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
231. Bosworth-Davies, supra note 17, at 6.
232. Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries, 18 Nw.
J. I',.'L L. & Bus. 524, 527 (1998) (citing Rance P.L. Lee, Bureaucratic Corruption in
Asia: The Problem of Incongruence Between Legal Norms and Folk Norms, in BUREAUCRATIC
CORRUPTION IN ASIA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROLS 69, 101-03 (Ledivina V.
Carifto ed., 1986); Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler, The Process of Bureaucratic Corruption in
Asia: Emerging Patterns, in BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN ASIA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES
AND CONTROLS, supra, at 15, 66).
